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THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN ON
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUDWIK A. TECLAFF*
THE ORIGIN OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Until the middle of the twentieth century environmental concern
made but a small contribution to the shaping of international law;
Throughout most of history there was little understanding of man's
capacity to affect the environment on a large scale; and, even when
this capacity increased to global dimensions, its implications were
only slowly realized. The influence of environmental concern was
initially confined to an area where ecosystems of neighboring states
were most intimately linked and yet were not vast enough to readily
absorb the impact of heavy use and development-that is, to
transboundary rivers and lakes. It is in fluvial relations between states
that we find the first attempts to apply the principles of good
neighborliness and abuse of right. Lauterpacht's examples to support
the applicability of abuse of right to international law come from
water disputes.' Andrassy bolsters the principle of good neighborliness
with analogies from state dealings concerning water resources.2 But
the status of abuse of right as a general principle of law, and thus of
international law, is far from established even today, 3 and any
restrictions on states' rights to deal as they pleased with transboundary waters within their borders were rejected, not only by many
19th-century writers 4, but also by the practice of some leading
states. 5 The problem with general principles like good neighborliness
and abuse of right is that they lack sufficient precision to permit their
application with any degree of confidence in concrete cases; and they
become superfluous in any area such as modern fluvial law in which
more or less concrete rules are developed. However, from the
beginning of the 19th century, neighborliness did force states to
conclude treaties which, as a rule, limited their free use of transboundary waters in the frontier zone. These treaties placed a heavy
*Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community 290-94 passim
(1933).

2. J. Andrassy, Les relations internationalesde voisinage, Academie de Droit International, II
Recueil des Cours 77-181 (1951).
3. E.g., F. Berber states: "it has been seen beyond all doubt that such a rnle of the abuse of
rights does not exist as a general principle of law recognised by civilised nations." Berber, Rivers
in International Law 210 (1959).
4. Id., at 14.
5. Such as the United States, in the celebrated turn-of-the-century dispute with Mexico over
waters of the Rio Grande, during which Attorney-General Harmon delivered the opinion that
the United States was not bound by any "rules, principles, and precedents of international law"
in making use of waters flowing through its territory. 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 267 (1895).
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obligation on the party states to maintain boundary waters in a
natural condition and not to make any alteration in the flow, bed, or
banks (including diversion of water), without the consent of the
6
governments concerned.
The correlation between awareness of capacity to inflict injury and
the emergence of rules regulating use of the environment is even
better illustrated in the case of the oceans. Well into the 20th century,
the belief prevailed that ocean resources were generally inexhaustible
and could not sustain permanent injury from human activities.7 As a
consequence, freedom to exploit living resources became one of the
freedoms of the sea 8 and helped to prevent or, at least, retard the
emergence of effective protection rules. Fisheries conventions, which
tended to be concerned with division of the spoils, did little to create
international machinery which would effectively implement
whatever conservation measures they did contain. 9 Likewise, no
specific ocean pollution prohibitions evolved in customary interna6. See, e.g., Treaty on Boundaries between their Majesties the King of Prussia and the King
of The Netherlands, Oct. 7, 1816, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil 54-55; Treaty for the Regulation
of Water from the Meuse between Belgium and The Netherlands, May 12, 1863, 1 Martens
Nouveau Recueil 120 (ser. 2); Agreement between Switzerland and the Grand-Duchy of Baden
concerning the Navigation of the Rhine from Neuhausen to below Basel, May 10, 1879,
(1878-89) 4 Recueil Officiel des lois Ordonnances Switzerland 339 (ser. N); Additional Act of
May 26, 1866 to the Treaties Determining Boundaries, concluded Dec. 2, 1856, Apr. 14, 1862
and May 26, 1866 between France and Spain, 9 Clerq, Recueil des Trait~s de la France 544;
Agreement between her Majesty the Queen-Empress and S.A.S. Electorale Palatine, May 13,
1779, 2 Martens Recueil 671 (2d. ed.).
7. E.g., McDougal & Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans vii-viii (1962), in which it is
claimed that the living resources of the oceans are "difficult or impossible to deplete in a degree
technologically irreversible."
8. It'was finally enshrined in Art. 2 of the Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958,
[1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, which states, "Freedom of the high
seas . . . comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal states:
(2) Freedom of fishing.
9. E.g., the 1882 Convention for Regulating the Police of the North Sea Fisheries, 73 British
and Foreign State Papers 39 (1882), which remained in force until updated by the London
Fisheries Convention of Mar. 9, 1964, 581 U.N.T.S. 57, U.N. Legis. Ser. (Seas) 862
(ST/LEC.SER.B/15) (1970). States parties to the 1964 Convention, which carves up all the
North Sea and Atlantic coastlines of western Europe into exclusive and semi-exclusive fishery
zones, are empowered but not required or even exhorted to regulate the fisheries. A different
approach to division of the catch was tried in the 1952 International Convention for the High
Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, 205 U.N.T.S. 65, which contains in its Annex the
famous abstention principle. The Interim Convention on the Conservation of the North Pacific
Fur Seals, signed Feb. 9, 1957, 314 U.N.T.S. 105, provides for equitable sharing of the catch but,
in establishing the North Pacific Fur Seal Commission, gives that body no authority to apply
conservation measures, only recommendatory powers. As Johnston has noted: "As long as the
scheme of allocation is considered generally to be equitable, there will be little motivation for
the development of regulatory competences under international authority." D. Johnston, The
International Law of Fisheries 269 (1965).
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tional law; and whatever prohibitions could be deduced from the
principle of freedom of the high seas were never applied. 1°
From the third decade of this century, however, appreciation of
man's capacity to affect and destroy the environment on a large scale
began to grow. Already in the 1920's there was awareness of the
damage that could be done by oil pollution;" and soon after World
War II, the impact of rapid population growth on food resources and
land aroused intensified concern.' 2 But the most potent factor in
awakening a popular realization of man's destructive power was the
development of nuclear energy. Controversy as to the lawfulness of
3
nuclear testing brought environmental pollution sharply into focus.'
AREAS AND DIRECTION OF EVOLUTION
A. Fluvial Law
New technological advances affected fluvial law earlier than other
branches of law because of the particular sensitivity of the fluvial
environment to increased use and development. The effects became
evident in pressure to abandon all vestiges of absolute state
sovereignty (as embodied for instance in the Harmon Doctrine 4), and
to replace unilateral disposition of transboundary waters within state
borders with a rule requiring consent of the states involved for any
alterations which would affect them. This rule, initially established by
convention for waters in the frontier zone, 15 was expressed as a
general rule in the Declaration of Montevideo:
In consequence, no state may, without the consent of the other
riparian state, introduce into water courses of an international
character, for the industrial or agricultural exploitation of their
waters, any alteration which may prove injurious to the margin of
the other interested state.' 6
10. See Teclaff, International Law and the Protection of the Oceans from Pollution, 40
Fordham L.R. 529, 530-31 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Teclaff, Pollution].
11. Shepheard & Mann, Reducing the Menace of Oil Pollution, 31 Dep't State Bull. 311
(1954). See also 4 M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law 690 (1965).
12. E.g., F. Osborn, Our Plundered Planet (1948); W. Vogt, The Limits of the Earth (1953);
W. Vogt, Road to Survival (1948).
13. See, e.g., McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Test in Perspective, 64 Yale L.J. 648
(1955), arguing for the lawfulness, and E. Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and
InternationalLaw, 64 Yale L.J. 629 (1955), against it. See also debates in the International Law
Commission concerning the draft articles of the Law of the Sea, 1 Year Book Int'l L. Comm'n
31-35, (1956).
14. See supra note 5.
15. See supra note 6.
16. Seventh International Conference of American States, Declaration on Industrial and
Agricultural Use of International Rivers, 12, text in 28 Am. J. Int'l L. 59 (Supp. 1934). See also,
the International Law Institute's Madrid Declaration of 1911 which stated:
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It is doubtful, however, whether this stricture, amounting to a power
of veto by one state over the fluvial projects of another, ever became
anything more than a recommendation. The Arbitral Tribunal in the
Lake Lanoux case rejected it and held that, in the absence of specific
obligations imposed by agreement, all that international law requires
of states is to take into account the interests of the other riparian.1 7
The Lake Lanoux award defined only conditions under which a
state can unilaterally undertake projects on an international stream. It
did not define the extent to which a state may appropriate the waters
of that stream when no agreement between the riparians exists. This
question was taken up by the International Law Association (I.L.A.)
in the Helsinki Rules of 1966.18 Reflecting developments in legal
II. When a stream traverses successively the territories of two or more States:
1. The point where this stream crosses the frontiers of two States,
whether naturally, or since time immemorial, may not be changed
by establishments of one of the States without the consent of the
other. . . 24 Ann. de I'Inst. de Droit Intl 367(1911).
Droit Intl 367 (1911).
17. In the Lake Lanoux case, the Arbitral Tribunal stated:
But international practice does not so far permit more than the following
conclusion: the rule that States may utilize the hydraulic power of international
watercourses only on condition of a prior agreement between the interested States
cannot be established as a custom, even less as a general principle of law.
It is for each state to evaluate in a reasonable manner and in good faith the
situations and the rules which will involve it in controversies; its evaluation may
be in contradiction with that of another State; in that case, should a dispute arise
the Parties normally seek to resolve it by negotiation or, alternatively, by
submitting to the authority of a third party; but one of them is never obliged to
suspend the exercise of its jurisdiction because of the dispute except when it
assumes an obligation to do so.
The Tribunal is of the opinion that, according to the rules of good faith, the
upstream State is under the obligation to take into consideration the various
interests involved, to seek to give them every satisfaction compatible with the
pursuit of its own interests, and to show that in this regard, it is genuinely
concerned to reconcile the interests of the other riparian State with its own. Lake
Lanoux Case (France v. Spain), 24 I.L.R. 101, 130, 132, 138-139 (1957).
On the general applicability of rules propounded by the Tribunal, see A. Gervais, LAffaire du
Lac Lanoux, 6 Annuaire Franqais de Droit International 373, 420-23 (1960), which states:
Le penchant du Tribunal A 61argir les problbmes et A donner des solutions de
principe est fortement marqfe dans la definition qu'il adopte des int6rdts qui
doivent Atre sauvegardds ...
A partir de cette base 6troite, et sans s'y r6f6rer, sinon pour la forme dans
l'avant-dernier alin6a de son paragraphe 24, la sentence 6tablit une remarquable
construction logique, par raisonnement sur la situation juridique A partir de la
notion de bonne foi. D6passant de loin le cas particulier du Lanoux et de I'Acte
additionnel de 1866 la m6thode ainsi d6finie par le Tribunal est valable pour
r6soudre tous les conflits de droits et d'int6r6ts soulev6s par n'importe quel
am6nagement hydraulique projet6 par un Etat quelconque et susceptible d'avoir
des r6percussions chez ses voisins.
18. Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, International Law
Association, Report of the 52nd Conference held at Helsinki, Aug. 17-20, 1966, 477-533 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Helsinki Rules].
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thought since the beginning of the century, 19 the Rules substitute the
river basin for the individual river as being the appropriate unit for
water resources management and exploitation,2 0 and apply to the
developed by the
basin waters principles of equitable apportionment
2l
United States Supreme Court and other tribunals.
The principle of equitable apportionment brings a degree of
rationality into use of the waters of politically divided river basins.
However, it does not encompass, except perhaps by implication,
damage done by water resource development to other elements of the
environment. 22 It has become increasingly evident that projects
which are beneficial for water use per se may have very detrimental
side effects-two frequently cited examples being the Aswan and
Kariba dams. 23 By the time of the publication of the Rules, concern
with the impact of water development on the environment had
already spurred a search for principles in municipal water law which
would reconcile benefit with detriment. This, for example, was the
object of a major study commissioned in the United States by the
19. See L. Teclaff, The River Basin in History and Law 152-155 (1967) [hereinafter cited as'
Teclaff, River Basin].
20. Helsinki Rules, supra note 18, arts. I, II and III. Though adaptable as a guide for the
coordinated multi-purpose development of an entire river basin, based on agreement between
the co-basin states, the Helsinki Rules are meant rather for the kind of situation in which each
basin state develops the waters of its part of the basin individually and separately. This may be
seen not only in the choice, in Article V of the Rules, of factors relevant to the establishment of
an equitable share in the beneficial use of the waters, but also in the wording and choice of
examples in the Comment.
21. See Art. IV of the Helsinki Rules and Comment, supra note 18. The limitations of the
principle of equitable apportionment are well stated in A. Utton, International Streams and
Lakes, 2 Waters and Water Rights 403, at 427-28 (R. Clark ed. 1967):
Although flexibility is one of the strengths of equitable apportionment, there is
also a kind of narrowness in the principle. Equitable apportionment contemplates
independent development by each country on its own side of the border; each
country is allocated a quantity of water for its own use and development. Such a
settlement, by a negotiated treaty or the decision of an impartial tribunal, may be
laudable. But independent development is unlikely to make the maximum use of
an international drainage basin. Instead of thinking in terms of artificial
boundaries and allocations of quantities of water under theories of equitable
apportionment, we must, because of the increasing demand for water, think in
terms of the best utilization of the entire resource. (Citations omitted)
See generally on equitable utilization, J. Lipper, Equitable Utilization, The Law of International
Drainage Basins (A. Garretson et al. eds. 1967), especially 41-56.
22. The damage to the environment of a co-basin state may be taken as one of the factors in
determining what is a reasonable and equitable share in water development benefits according
to Art. V of the Helsinki Rules, supra note 18, which does not specifically list environmental
damage but is broad enough to be interpreted as including it by implication.
23. See W. J. Roberts, Man-made lakes, their problems and environmental effects, 7 Nature
and Resources 14 (No. 4, Dec. 1971); see also B. Ward & R. Dubos, Only One Earth 163 (1972);
M. Nicholson, The Environmental Revolution: A Guide for the New Masters of the World 86
(1970).
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National Water Commission.2 4 Recognition of the problem and the
preparatory work of the Stockholm Conference and in its final
Recommendation 51. The preparatory text was a strongly worded
exhortation:
that nations agree that when water resources activities are
contemplated that may have an environmental effect on another
country, the other country be notified well in advance of the
activity envisaged .... 25
In its progress through Committee II and the Plenary, however, the
26
passage lost much of its force through amendment.
If the Helsinki Rules failed to take account of the detrimental
effects of water use and development on other elements of the
environment, they did deal, under the heading of pollution, with the
protection of water itself.2 7 However, the formulation of the duty of
states to prevent and to abate pollution is not absolute; and it permits
varying degrees of pollution as a consequence of beneficial lawful
uses. Thus the Comment to Article 10 states:
24. Environmental Quality and Water Development (C. Goldman ed. 1972). The major
recommendations of this study were (1) to engage public involvement at all levels of planning so
as to balance environmental values against developmental aspects; (2) Incorporation of new
techniques of evaluation of water development projects to give a much broader spectrum of
social and environmental aspects than is afforded by traditional benefit-cost analysis (specific
elements of this would be thorough impact statements and effective monitoring programs); (3)
creation of a separate governmental agency for water development planning and evaluation
from construction; (4) post-auditing of projects already completed to establish their actual
economic return and determine their environmental impact.
25. United Nations General Assembly Conference on the Human Environment, Environmental Aspects of Natural Resources Management, 159 (U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/7) (Preparatory
Document).
26. Recommendation 51 of the Action Plan for the Human Environment, contained in
United Nations General Assembly, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment held at Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as the Stockholm Report]. The Stockholm Report was considered by the 27th Session of
the U.N. General Assembly in the fall of 1972. After extensive debate, the Second Committee of
the General Assembly recommended the adoption of the Report, with some changes, to the
General Assembly. The changes did not affect the Action Plan at all and the Declaration only
slightly; they pertained mainly to the institutional and financial arrangements. See United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Report of the Second Committee, U.N. Doc.
A/8901 (1972).
27. Art. X of the Helsinki Rules supra note 18, states:
1. Consistent with the principle of equitable utilization of the waters of an
international drainage basin, a State
(a) must prevent any new form of water pollution or any increase in
the degree of existing water pollution in an international drainage
basin which would cause substantial injury in the territory of a
co-basin State, and (b) should take all reasonable measures to abate
existing water pollution in an international drainage basin to such
an extent that no substantial damage is caused in the territory of a
co-basin State.
Helsinki Rules, supra note 18, at 19-20.
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A use that causes pollution to the extent of depriving a co-basin
State of an equitable share stands on the same basis (as diversion).
By parallel reasoning, a State that engages in a use or uses causing
pollution is not required to take measures with respect to such
28
pollution that would deprive it of equitable utilization ....
Under this formulation, it is conceivable that pollution deriving from
an otherwise reasonable and equitable use might do serious environmental damage before resulting in any substantial injury which would
deprive a state of its equitable share. This is true even of a state which
does not as yet make much use of a river and, which, because of a
primitive economic base, does not plan to use it in the near future.
This situation would not occur if, instead of applying the principle of
equitable apportionment, the duty to cease polluting would arise as
soon as the activities of one co-basin state resulted in noticeable

pollution in parts of the river basin under the jurisdiction of other
states. Such a rule finds support in the absolute prohibition on
pollution contained in some water treaties, though that may have
been due rather to a lack of understanding of pollution and the
primitiveness of the applicable law than to a desire to eliminate
pollution altogether. 2 9 It is consistent also with a trend in some
municipal law-for example, the legislation to amend the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act in the United States, which establishes as
28. Id. at 22.
29. E.g., Art IV of the Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising Along the
Boundary between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. 548; U.N.
Legis. Ser., Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the Utilization of International
Rivers for Other Purposes than Navigation 260 (1963) (ST/LEG/SER.B./12) [hereinafter
referred to as U.N. Legis. Ser. (Rivers)], which states "the waters herein defined as boundary
waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the injury
of health or property on the other." Also Treaty Between Denmark and Germany, Apr. 10,
1922, art. 29 (10 L.N.T.S. 215; U.N. Legis. Ser. (Rivers) 588) "The water course may not be used
in such a manner that: (1) The height of the tidal water would be altered or the water polluted
to the detriment of other persons.
... Some of the agreements concluded by the Soviet Union
and socialist states of eastern Europe contain even more emphatic prohibitions. The
Finnish-Soviet agreement of June 23, 1960, concerning frontier waters states in Art. 16: "The
Contracting Parties shall ensure that the frontier waters are kept clean and are not artificially
polluted or fouled in any way.
... U.N. Legis Ser. (Rivers) 656. An identical provision occurs
in the Norwegian-Soviet agreement of Dec, 29, 1949 (U.N. Legis. Ser. (Rivers) 882). More
specific wording is to be found in the Romanian-Soviet Agreement of Nov. 25, 1949, art. 17:
The competent authorities of the Contracting Parties shall take steps to maintain
the frontier waters in such due state of cleanliness as to prevent the waters from
being poisoned or polluted by acids or refuse from factories or industrial
establishments, or from being fouled by any other means.
U.N. Legis. Ser. (Rivers) 291. Similar phrasing, which is at the same time absolute, specific, and
comprehensive, is contained in the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 8, 1948 (U.N. Legis Ser.
(Rivers) 890), art. 17, and in the Yugoslav-Hungarian agreement concerning fishing in frontier
waters of May 25, 1957 (U.N. Legis. Ser. (Rivers) 836-37), art. 5, which prohibits the discharge of
pollutants harmful to aquatic wildlife "irrespective of the manner in which and the distance
from which such substances reach the frontier waters."
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a national goal the cessation of all discharge of pollutants into United
States navigable waters by 1985.30
The no-pollution/too-much-pollution dilemma will be greatly
alleviated when the duty to formulate pollution standards is generally
established by treaty or customary law and the methods of formulating those standards are perfected. The necessity of such a formulation
is already widely recognized and has been explicitly acknowledged in
a number of recommendations of the Stockholm Conference. 3 1 It has
been voiced by such organizations as the I.LA. 32 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.).33
Furthermore, pollution standards have been already included in some
draft conventions, for instance, the Council of Europe's Preliminary
Draft Convention on the Protection of Fresh Waters Against
Pollution. 34 There is little question that the duty to establish standards
soon will become mandatory in international law.
30. Federal Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500.
31. E.g., Recommendation 72 of the Action Plan States: "It is recommended that in
establishing standards for pollutants of international significance, Governments take into
consideration the relevant standards proposed by competent international organizations ....
Stockholm Report, supra note 26, at 40. See also Recommendation 81:
that the World Health Organization, together with the competent international
organizations, continue to study, and establish, primary standards for the
protection of the human organism, especially from pollutants that are common to
air, water, and food, as a basis for the establishment of derived working limits. Id.,
at 43.
Similar proposals are contained in Recommendation 82, that increased support be given to the
Codex Alimentarius to develop international standards for pollutants in food id. at 43-44 and
Recommendation 83, that the "appropriate United Nations agencies develop agreed procedures
for setting derived working limits for common air and water contaminants" id. at 44.
32. International Law Association, New York Conference (1972), Committee on International Water Resources Law, Report, Declaration on Marine Pollution of Continental Origin 58,
at 63 (1972). Art. 111(a) of which states: "States should establish, as soon as possible, international
standards for the control of sea-water pollution, having regard to all relevant factors .. "
33. At its meeting in Paris, May 24-26, 1972, the Ministerial Council of the O.E.C.D.
adopted a Council recommendation defining a set of Guiding Principles Concerning Environmental Policies (OECD Doc. C (72) 122 (Final)), to be observed by member governments in
determining environmental control policies and measures. Principles 6-10 concern environmental standards and, while noting the legitimate differences between national environmental
policies and the desirability of avoiding the creation of trade barriers, urge harmonization of
protection measures and the establishment of common standards for polluting products that are
traded internationally. 66 Dep't State Bull. 837-38 (1972).
34. Council of Europe Preliminary Draft of the European Convention on the Protection of
Fresh Waters Against Pollution, Art. 3, Doc. 2561, May 12, 1969:
Each Contracting Party shall take all measures appropriate to the maintenance or
improvement of the quality of the water of international drainage basins to a level
which is not inferior to the minimum standards defined in the Appendix to this
Convention.
See also The 1968 European Agreement on the Restriction of the Use of Certain Detergents in
Washing and Cleaning Products, Sept. 16, 1968, European T.S. 64 brought about through the
instrumentality of both the Council of Europe and the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development.
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Along with the formulation of standards-indeed, a prerequisite to
them-goes the acquisition and exchange of information for the
protection of the environment. Gathering information about particular aspects of the environment has long been required by some
municipal laws, 35 and, in the international sphere, has been performed by various organizations in specialized fields. 36 Generally,
however, there has been little correlation between this data gathering
and the protection of the environment as a whole; in fact, it was
geared rather to development than to protection. Not until the
Stockholm Conference did the subject receive the attention that it
deserves. Monitoring was made one of the key points of the Action
Plan,3 7 and the individual states are required to support international
monitoring systems, which it is the duty of international organizations
38
to develop.
35. For example, the so-called 308 Reports prepared in accordance with a Congressional
directive of 1925 authorizing the Corps of Engineers to carry out a comprehensive study of
navigable streams with a view to their development for power production, flood control and
irrigation. Act of Mar. 3, 1925, ch. 467, §3, 43 Stat. 1190. The Engineers' data-gathering role
goes back to 1871 when observations were begun on the Mississippi River.
36. E.g., the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) gathers environmental data on
agriculture, forestry, and fisheries; the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) on the
atmosphere; the World Health Organization (WHO) on pollutants as they effect human health;
the International Labor Organization (ILO) and WHO on the working environment; the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on safe use of nuclear energy; the InterGovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) on marine pollution; and the
United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESCO) has a continuing, long-term
programme of scientific and technical information exchange. For a detailed account of
information collection and interpretation by international organizations, see United Nations
General Assembly, Consolidated Document on the United Nations System and the Human
Environment Submitted by the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, at 36-39, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.48/12 (1971).
37. The recommendations on monitoring are numbers 18, 25, 29, 30, 40, 46, 51, 55, 57, 67,
73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 87, 90, 91, 94, 95, and 105. See Stockholm Report, supm note 26.
38. The basic recommendation is No. 74:
the Secretary-General, drawing on the resources of the United Nations system,
and with the active support of Governments and appropriate scientific and other
international bodies:
(a) Increase the capability of the United Nations system to provide awareness
and advance warning of deleterious effects to human health and well-being from
man-made pollutants;
(b) Provide this information in a form which is useful to policy-makers at the
national level;
(c) Assist those Governments which desire to incorporate these and other
environmental factors into national planning processes;
(d) Improve the international acceptability of procedures for testing pollutants
and contaminants by:
(i) International division of labour in carrying out the large-scale
testing programmes needed;
(ii) Development of international schedules of tests for evaluation of
the environment impact potential of scientific contaminants or products.
Such a schedule of tests should include consideration of both short-term
and long-term effects of all kinds and should be reviewed and brought up
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The Stockholm Conference also goes far beyond the existing
international law in recognizing the necessity for states to provide
information on the environmental effects of their major projects. 39 If
incorporated into formal agreements, this would bring into internato date from time to time to take into account new knowledge and
techniques;
(iii) Development and implementation of an international intercalibration programme for sampling and analytical techniques to permit more
meaningful comparisons of national data;
(iv) Develop plans for an International Registry of Data on Chemicals
in the Environment based on a collection of available scientific data on the
environmental behaviour of the most important man-made chemicals and
containing production figures of the potentially most harmful chemicals,
together with their pathways from factory via utilization to ultimate
disposal or recirculation.
Stockholm Report, supra note 26, at 40-41.
39. Recommendation 3 of the Action Plan:
that the attention of Governments be drawn to the need to consult bilaterally or
regionally whenever environmental conditions or development plans in one
country could have repercussions in one or more neighbouring countries.
Stockholm Report, supra note 26, at 10.
Recommendation 51:
[t]hat when major water resource activities are contemplated that may have a
significant environmental effect on another country, the other country should be
notified well in advance of the activity envisaged. . . . Id. at 33. (But the force of
this is blunted by the preambular statement that it should merely be "considered
by the States concerned when appropriate." Id.)
The original Draft Declaration on the Human Environment (preliminary doc. A/CONF.48/4)
contained in its Principle 20 a strongly worded exhortation:
Relevant information must be supplied by States on activities or developments
within their jurisdiction or under their control whenever they believe, or have
reason to believe, that such information is needed to avoid the risk of significant
adverse effects on the environment in areas beyond their national jurisdiction.
Disagreement at Stockholm prevented the inclusion of this principle in the Declaration adopted
by the Conference, Stockholm Report, supra note 18, at 4-7, and it was referred to the General
Assembly for consideration. In modified form it reappeared in Draft Resolution II of the Report
of the General Assembly's Second Committee, see supra note 26, A/8901, at 34 as follows:
The General Assembly,
Having considered the text of principle 20 of the Declaration of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, referred to it for consideration
by the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
1. Emphasizes that, in the exploration, exploitation, and development of their
natural resources, States must not produce significant harmful effects in zones
situated outside their national jurisdiction;
2. Recognizes that co-operation between States . . . will be effectively
achieved if official and public knowledge is provided of the technical data relating
to the work to be carried out by States within their national jurisdiction with a
view to avoiding significant harm that may occur in the human environment of
the adjacent area;
3. Recognizes further that the technical data referred to . . . will be given
and received in the best spirit of co-operation and good neighbourliness, without
this being construed as enabling each State to delay or impede the programmes
and projects . . . of the States in whose territories such programmes and projects
are carried out.
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tional law the nearest approximation to the environmental impact
statements required in United States law under the National Environmental Protection Act; 40 and, even if not implemented in the near
future, it undoubtedly indicates a trend.
Although the foregoing discussion has concerned itself with matters
to be established by agreement, it may be that the duty to give
warning of impending natural disasters has already passed into
customary international law. This contention finds support in the
Corfu Channel case, where the International Court of Justice stated
that Albania had the duty to warn other states of the peril from mines
in her territorial waters. 4 1 The Corfu Channel judgment may be
interpreted narrowly as pertaining only to warning of perils within a
state's territory, but other support for this contention can be derived
from the clauses of the numerous flood control treaties which require
42
adequate warning of flood peril passing from one state to another.
Moreover, the Action Plan of the Stockholm Conference contains
40. 42 U.S.C.§4332 (2)(C)(1970). Some of the Stockholm Conference recommendations
already approach the requirement of impact statements. See, e.g., Recommendation 60, that
systematic audits of natural resource development projects in representative ecosystems of
international significance be undertaken (by the appropriate U.N. agencies and governments
concerned) after "and, where feasible before," the implementation of such projects. Stockholm
Report, supra note 26, at 37. Recommendation 61, id. at 38, urges that pilot studies be
conducted in such representative ecosystems to assess the environmental impact of alternative
approaches to planning and development of particular projects, and Recommendation 63, id.,
forthrightly lays upon the Secretary-General the duty to ". . . ensure that international
development assistance agencies, in co-operation with recipient Governments, intensify efforts
to revise and broaden the criteria of development project analysis to incorporate environmental
impact considerations."
41. The International Court of Justice stated in the Corfu Channel Case:
The obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authorities consisted in notifying,
for the benefit of shipping in general, the existence of minefield in Albanian
territorial waters and in warning the approaching British warships of the
imminent danger to which the minefield exposed them. Such obligations are
based, not on the Hague Convention of 1907, No. VIII, which is applicable in
time of war, but on certain general and well-recognized principles, namely
elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war;
the principle of the freedom of maritime communication; and every state's
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the
rights of other states. [1949] I.C.J. 4, 22.
42. Provisions on the duty to exchange information and flood warnings can be found in
treaties from different parts of the world, e.g.: Egypt-United Kingdom (on behalf of Uganda),
Exchange of notes . . . regarding cooperation in meteorological and hydrological surveys in
certain areas of the Nile Basin, Jan. 19, Feb. 28 and Mar. 20, 1950, 226 U.N.T.S. 288, U.N. Legis.
Ser. (Rivers) 112; Mexico-U.S.A., Colorado-Tijuana-Rio Grande treaty of Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat.
1219, T.S. No. 994, 3 U.N.T.S. 314, U.N. Legis. Ser. (Rivers) 236; India-Pakistan, Indus Waters
Treaty of Sept. 19, 1960, 362 U.N.T.S. 4, U.N. Legis. Ser. (Rivers) 300; Germany (Democratic
Republic)-Poland, Feb. 6, 1952, 304 U.N.T.S. 160, U.N. Legis. Ser. (Rivers) 766; Poland-U.S.S.R.,
July 8, 1948, 37 U.N.T.S. 66, U.N. Legis. Ser. (Rivers) 887.
Discussion and an exhaustive list of flood-control agreements can be found in F. Berber, Report
on Flood Control of the Rapporteur, International Law Association, New York Conference
(1972), Committee on International Water Resources Law, Report 4-58 (1972).
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recommendations for the establishment of a worldwide warning
system based on existing and to-be-established national and interna43
tional institutions devoted to this task.
B. The Law of the Sea
The law of the sea was another area that began to respond to the
increased awareness of perils to the environment not much later than
fluvial law. After World War I, oil slicks from the growing tanker
fleets shook the belief in the invulnerability of the oceans, and the
remedy proposed then was a total ban on oil pollution. However, this
was too radical for the times, and the draft convention of 1926 merely
44
proposed offshore zones in which oil discharge would be barred. It
took until 1954 to conclude a convention incorporating even this
concept; 45 and the zones, after all, were not really oil-free. The
Convention simply reduced the amount of permissible discharge and
provided for its control; 46 it left the punishment for violations in the
hands of the state of registry. 47 The advent of supertankers, however,
and the spread of concern for the oceans led to a tightening up of the
Convention, first by the 1962 amendment (extending the system of
zones outward to 100 miles in most areas), 48 and, most recently, by
the 1969 amendments which are not yet in force. 49 The latter
approach, but do not quite achieve, a total ban by dispensing with
zones and limiting the oil discharge rate anywhere for ships other
than tankers to no more than 60 liters per mile and to an oil content
of less than 100 to 1 million parts of the mixture. For tankers, the total
quantity of oil discharge on a ballast voyage is limited to one-fifteen
thousandth of the total cargo carrying capacity. 50
Total elimination of international pollution by intentional dis43. See, Recommendation 18(d) of the Action Plan, that the Secretary-General, with the
assistance of the Disaster Relief Co-ordinator and in consultation with the appropriate bodies
of the United Nations system and non governmental bodies:
[p]romote, through existing national and international organizations, the establishment of an effective world-wide natural disaster warning system, with special
emphasis on tropical cyclones and earthquakes, taking full advantage of existing
systems and plans, such as the World Weather Watch, the World Meteorological
Organization's Tropical Cyclone Project, the International Tsunami Warning
System, the World-Wide Standardized Seismic Network and the Desert Locust
Control Organization. . . . Stockholm Report, supra note 26, at 14-15.
44. Final Act of the Preliminary Conference on Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters, Annex,
art. 1, [1926] 1 Foreign Rel. U.S. 238, 245 (1941).
45. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, done May 12,
1954, [1961] 3 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3.
46. Id. art. III.
47. Id., art. X.
48. International Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil, adopted
Apr. 11, 1962, [1966] 2 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332.
49. For the text of the completely amended convention, see 9 Int'l Leg. Materials 1 (1970).
50. Id., art. III(a)(b), at 3-4.
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charge of oil and noxious substances from ships is the main objective
of the 1973 IMCO Conference on Marine Pollution. In addition, a
new international convention is being drafted with the purpose of
achieving this goal by 1975, if possible, or, if not, by the end of the
51
decade.
Once the 1954 Convention had paved the way, other forms of
ocean pollution were dealt with, albeit in a somewhat piecemeal and
inadequate fashion, by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High
Seas52 which established the duty of states to draw up regulations for
the prevention of oil discharge not only from ships but from pipelines
as well. 53 It established a similar duty concerning the dumping of
radioactive waste, 54 but omitted the dumping of other toxic materials.
This omission is in the process of being remedied. Thus, in preparation for the Law of the Sea Conference in 1973, the United States
submitted a draft convention which imposed on states a duty to
regulate ocean dumping by permit, which, while allowing each state
to establish its own dumping criteria, would limit discretion to issue
permits when unreasonable pollution would result. 55 Another draft
convention, adopted by the 29-nation Intergovernmental Meeting on
Ocean Dumping held at Reykjavik in April 1972, was forwarded to
the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment for further
56
consideration. It was even stronger than the United States proposals,
prohibiting the dumping of some substances, such as mercury and
cadmium,5 7 altogether and subjecting others to special permits as
well as requiring general permits or approvals for a third category.5 8
As a result of the Stockholm Conference, a convention was adopted in
London on November 13, 1972, which generally embodies the
approach to the problem worked out at Reykjavik. 59 Previously, along
the general lines of these proposals, six European states had signed a
regional convention embodying a total prohibition on the dumping
51. See Council on Environmental Quality, Third Annual Report, Environmental Quality 81
(1972).
52. Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No.
5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
53. Id., art. 24.
54. Id., art. 25.
55. U.S. Draft Convention on the Regulation of Ocean Dumping, reprinted in 10 Int'l Leg.
Materials 1021 (1971).
56. Draft Articles of A Convention on Ocean Dumping, in United Nations, Conference on
the Human Environment, Identification and Control of Pollutants of Broad International
Significance, Addendum No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/8 Add. 1 (1972).
57. Id., Annex I, at 11.
58. Id., art. VI, Annexes II and III.
59. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping Wastes and Other
Matter, done at London, Nov. 13, 1972. Text in 67 Dep't State Bull. 711-17 (1972).
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from ships and aircraft of the most toxic materials and the control in
60
varying degree of others, depending on their toxicity.
Although these conventions, whether still in draft or already
adopted, are an important step forward in the protection of the
oceans, the question still remains whether the marine environment is
entitled to protection outside the conventional law. It may be safely
assumed by now that the Trail Smelter6 ' and Corfu Channel62 cases
have established state responsibility for pollution of the sea emanating
from the territory of one state and causing injury to that part of the
marine environment which is under the jurisdiction of another state.
Similarly, it can be assumed that if states do not perform the
supervision which might reasonably be expected over ships under
their flags, they can be held responsible for damage done by those
ships to the interests of other states. The Geneva Convention on the
High Seas which recognizes that a state must exercise a degree of
control over ships flying its flag, 6 3 probably restates customary
international law in this respect. However, responsibility for damage
to the marine environment in general, and especially to that part
outside the jurisdiction of any state, is a new development. It is
included both in several new or draft conventions concerning the
sea 6 4 and in the International Law Association's declaration on
marine pollution of continental origin. 6 5 It has also been adopted as a
major principle by the Stockholm Conference in its final Declaration,
which proclaims:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law . . . the responsibility to

ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas
beyond the limits of nationaljurisdiction.66 (Emphasis added).
60. Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft,
done at Oslo, Feb. 15, 1972. Text in 11 Int'l Leg. Materials 262 (1972).
61. Trail Smelter Case 23 (United States v. Canada), 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1938).
62. See Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) [1949] I.C.J. 4, 44.
63. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, supra note 52, at art. V.
64. The latest instruments, such as the United States Draft Convention on the Regulation of
Ocean Dumping, supra note 55; the Reykjavik draft convention on Ocean Dumping, supra note
56; and the United States Draft Convention On the International Seabed Area, 9 Int'l Leg.
Materials 1046 (1970) all impose on states the duty not to inflict damage on the marine
environment in general. See also the new Oslo Convention on Dumping, supra note 60.
65. International Law Association, Draft Articles on Marine Pollution of Continental Origin,
art. II, supra note 32, at 61.
66. Stockholm Report, supra note 26, at 7, Principle 21. The importance of Principle 21 was
expressly recognized by the U.N. General Assembly's Second Committee in Draft Resolution III
of its Report, see supra note 26, at 35) which stated:
Recalling principles 21 and 22 of the Declaration . . . concerning the international responsibility of States in regard to the human environment,
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Since this principle is reasonable and necessary and corresponds to
the interests of the international community, it would seem to be on
its way to becoming a rule of international customary law, just as the
right to exploit the continental shelf was earlier. It may even be
argued that these provisions and statements really bring out and give
precision to the prohibition on pollution that has lain dormant within
67
the concept of freedom of the sea.
It is one thing, however, to acknowledge state responsibility for
injury to the marine environment and quite another to bring states to
actually discharge this responsibility.6 8 Only in the case of oil
pollution has liability for damage been adequately worked out-by the
1969 Brussels Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution from
Ships which establishes limited strict liability and gives jurisdiction
over claims to the courts of the state which sustains the damage;6 9 and
by the 1971 Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage.70 However, the
1969 Liability Convention channels the liability to the shipowner and
does not establish state responsibility (except in the case of
state-owned merchant vessels). 7 ' On the other hand, the Convention
on the Fund does establish state responsibility but only indirectly by
providing for the creation, by States who were parties to the
Bearing in mind that those principles lay down the basic rules governing this
matter,
Declares that no resolution adopted at the twenty-seventh session of the General
Assembly can affect principles 21 and 22 ...
Generally on responsibility of states for injury to the marine environment, see Teclaff, Pollution,
supra note 10, at 541-47 (1972).
67. See Teclaff, Pollution,supra note 10, at 530-31:
Until specific customary rules do emerge the only limitations on pollution, apart
from conventions, must be sought in or deduced from rules regulating the use of
the oceans in general. Pollution of the sea is not itself a use-it is a modality or
consequence of a use. As such, it is a factor which can make any use permissible
or impermissible. Even if a use becomes accepted and established, it cannot be
exercised without regard to the welfare of other users. Thus, under the theory
that only recognized uses of the sea are permissible, pollution resulting from any
one of these uses would be prohibited if it unreasonably interfered with other uses
or users of the ocean. Similarly, under the theory that permits any uses of the
oceans as long as they are exercised in a reasonable fashion for peaceful purposes,
there must come a point when the detrimental effect of pollution reaches a level
which condemns that use or its exercise as unreasonable. (Citations omitted).
68. See generally, Bleicher, An Overview of International Environmental Regulation, 2
Ecology L.Q. 1, 12-30 (1972); Teclaff, Pollution, supra note 10, at 561.
69. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, arts. 3, 4 and 9,
reprinted in 9 Int'l Leg. Materials 45 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Brussels Liability Convention].
70. Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage, done at Brussels, Dec. 18, 1971, text in 11 Int'l Leg. Materials 284 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Brussels Compensation Fund Convention].
71. Brussels Liability Convention, supra note 68, arts. 2 and 14.
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Convention, of the fund which is to assume compensation when
liability exceeds the limits imposed by the 1969 Brussels Convention
72
or when the persons liable are unable to pay.
The difficulty of collecting any damages in international pollution
cases in the absence of a treaty is well illustrated by Judge Read's
comment on the Trail Smelter case:
The ordinary course followed by persons damaged by fumes from
a smelter was to bring a suit in the court of justice for damages
and for an injunction to prevent future damage. This, however,
was not satisfactory for the claimant in the State of Washington. It
was the general opinion of the lawyers concerned at the time that
the British Columbian courts would be compelled to refuse to
accept jurisdiction in suits based on damage to land situated
outside of the province. Apart, therefore, from the practical
difficulty confronting some hundreds of claimants in bringing suit
in a foreign
forum, there was the moral certainty that they would
73
lose.

This inadequacy of the law concerning liability for international
pollution was singled out by the Stockholm Conference in Principle
22 of the Declaration:
States shall co-operate to develop further the international law
regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution
and other environmental damage caused by activities within the
jurisdiction 74or control of such states to areas beyond their
jurisdiction.
It is clear that the task of development will have to be done by
convention, as in the case of oil pollution.
For pollution caused by private entities under their legal jurisdiction, states are not directly responsible. Responsibility in these
circumstances, however, can be imputed or transferred to the state
when it has knowledge of pollution emanating from its territory or has
neglected its duty of supervising ships on the high seas.7 5 The fact that
there are provisions in the 1967 Space Treaty7 6 and the United States
draft of the U.N. Convention on the International Sea Bed Area,7 7 for
example, imposing direct responsibility on a state for damage caused
72. Brussels Compensation Fund Convention, supra note 69, art. 4.
73. Read, The Trail Smelter Dispute, 1 Can. Yearbook Int'l L. 213, 222 (1963).
74. Stockholm Report, supra note 26, at 7. See also supra note 65.
75. See Teclaff, Pollution,supra note 10, at 545-47.
76. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27, 1967, art. 6, [1967],
3 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347.
77. United States Draft of U.N. Convention on the International Seabed Area, supra note 63,
at art. 11 (4).
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by all entities under its legal jurisdiction, may point to a trend that a
state should be responsible for any activities of all entities under its
legal jurisdiction even those which take place in areas outside its
territorial jurisdiction. Thus, on the high seas, for example, the
activities of entities other than state organs would be strictly imputed
to the state as soon as they were found to transgress a pertinent rule of
law. The finding of transgression might or might not depend on fault.
A state would simply become as responsible for private enterprises as
for its own activities. This is reflected in Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration that states are responsible for injury to the
78
environment outside the jurisdiction of any state.
Whereas environmental concern is producing, however, slowly and
painfully, new and more effective anti-pollution rules, this can hardly
be said of the protection of marine living resources. Fisheries treaties
still pay mere lip service to the protection of living resources, as such,
and, for the most part, are geared merely to dividing the catch among
nations. This tendency may be somewhat disguised in the Alaskan fur
seals convention 79 and the newly concluded Antarctic seals convention, 80 but it is amply evident in the convention which established the
International Whaling Commission. 81 Not only was the Commission
unable from its inception to afford any meaningful protection to
whales, but it was powerless to impose the moratorium recommended
by the Stockholm Conference. 8 2 The whaling nations appear bent on
dividing the dwindling catch until the last whale disappears, andfaced with this prospect of extinction-some of them (notably Japan)
have already moved on to the hunting of dolphins and porpoises in the
same manner. There is as little excuse for Japan's activities in her
claim of need to provide protein for human consumption as there is
for United States tuna fishermen who, by their reckless and wasteful
methods, kill several hundred thousand dolphins annually. 83 Environmental concern has made little impact on international law in this
area; and, before it takes hold, the dolphin may suffer the same fate as
its cousin, the whale.
The slowness of development of international rules for the protec78. Stockholm Report, supra note 26, at 7. See also supra note 65.
79. Interim Convention on the Conservation of the North Pacific Fur Seals signed Feb. 9,
1957, 8 U.S.T. 2283, T.I.A.S. No. 3948, 314 U.N.T.S. 105.
80. Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, London, (Feb. 3-11, 1972), text in 11
Int'l Legal Materials 251 (Mar. 1972).
81. International Convention For the Regulation of Whaling, done at Washington, D.C.,
Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72.
82. Recommendation 33 of the Action Plan, Stockholm Report, supra note 26, at 23. The
moratorium was rejected by the International Whaling Commission at its meeting June 26-30,
1972, in London. See Council on Environmental Quality, Third Annual Report 79.
83. Council on Environmental Quality, Id. at 96.
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tion of the marine environment in general is having an unexpected
side effect in that it has strengthened the claims of coastal states to
jurisdiction over large areas of the sea. 84 Thus, in 1969, Canada
enacted a statute which gives it power to control pollution in Arctic
waters out roughly to 100 miles from its coast and to lay and enforce
regulations for foreign ships. 85
The goal of the Canadian statute is to protect the unique and
fragile ecology of the Arctic, and its enactment was spurred by the
discovery of oil deposits in Alaska and by the opening up of the
Northwest Passage. The claim of a right to control potential pollution
more than 12 miles offshore 86 is reinforced by the fact that, in the
past, states have asserted the right to control certain activities such as
customs and immigration at a reasonable distance from their coasts, 87
though whether this included regulations for sanitary purposes (which
would encompass pollution) is debateable. 88 While the claim of a
right to control potential pollution beyond 12 miles offshore is still
resisted even when special circumstances are invoked, as in the
Arctic, a coastal state's unilateral move to protect itself against the
threat of existing pollution coming from the high seas outside the
contiguous zone seems to have been accepted as a justified form of
84. It strengthens and accelerates the trend begun by the Truman Proclamation of 1945,
Proclamation 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (Oct. 2, 1945), which laid claim to national jurisdiction
over the resources of the sea bed beyond the territorial sea. These claims were promptly
accepted by other states and not only became embodied in a convention (Geneva Convention on
the Continental Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958, [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S.
311), but also passed into customary international law, as indicated in the judgment in the North
Sea Cases:
With respect to the other elements usually regarded as necessary before a
conventional rule can be considered to have become a general rule of international law, it might be that, even without the passage of any considerable period
of time, a very widespread and representative participation in the convention
might suffice of itself, provided it included that of States whose interests were
specifically affected ...
[1969] I.C.J. 4, at 42. The very ease and success of this extension of state jurisdiction invited
similar claims concerning jurisdiction over resources in the superjacent waters, especially,
though not excusively, along coasts with poorly developed continental shelves, as, for example,
along the Pacific coast of South America. This is what is happening now in the widening of
fisheries zones, and rights to living resources in the superjacent waters may very likely become
assimilated to the rights states currently possess to the natural resources of the continental shelf
as far as concerns content and distance at which they can be exercised.
85. An Act to Amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 45 (1st
Supp. 1971).
86. Up to twelve miles beyond the territorial seas, states have this right on the basis of the
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29, 1958, art. 24
[1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. See Teclaff, Pollution, supra note 10,
at 551.
87. See L. Hydeman & W. Berman, International Control of Nuclear Maritime Activities
195-97 (1960); M. McDougal & W. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans 602 (1962).
88. Hydeman & Berman, Id. at 200; see also International Law Commission, Report to
General Assembly, [1956] 2 Yearbook Int'l L. Comm'n 294-295, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956).
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self-defense or self-protection. 89 The British hesitated, at first, to
apply it against the leaking hulk of the Torrey Canyon. However,
once they did, nobody protested; and, soon afterwards, the conclusion
of the 1969 Brussels Convention on Intervention on the High Seas in
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties attested further to its acceptance. 90
The Latin American states, too, claim an extended jurisdiction, but
over a zone extending 200 miles from the coast. In this case, the
prevention of pollution is only a secondary consideration; emphasis is
placed upon the protection of the living resources of the sea from
extinction through indiscriminate fishing practices. Thus, the Lima
Declaration of 1970, in paragraph 1, follows the established Latin
American line of arguments regarding the use and protection of
91
resources:
The inherent right of the coastal State to explore, conserve and
exploit the natural resources of the sea adjacent to its coasts and
the soil and subsoil thereof, .

. . ,

in order to promote the

maximum development of its economy and to raise the level of
living of its people .... 92
Paragraph 4 reinforces the usual arguments with a new argument
89. See Teclaff, Pollution, supra note 10, at 557-58.
90. International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties, done Nov. 29, 1969, in 9 Int'l Legal Materials 25 (1970). Art. 1 (1) states:
Parties to the present Convention may take such measures on the high seas as
may be necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to
their coastline or related interests from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea
by oil, following upon a maritime casualty or acts related to such a casualty,
which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences.
Only "in cases of extreme urgency requiring measures to be taken immediately," may a state
resort to such action without prior notification or consultation with the flag state and other
states affected by the casualty (Art. III (d)). See generally, Teclaff, Pollution, supra note 10, at
557-58.
91, See Declaration of Santiago, adopted by Chile, Ecuador and Peru in 1952, which states:
"the geological and biological factors affecting the existence, conservation and development of
the marine fauna and flora of the waters adjacent to the coasts of the declarant countries . . .which had rendered the former extent of territorial sea and contiguous zone: "insufficient to
permit of the conservation, development and use of those resources, to which the coastal
countries are entitled." Declaration of the Maritime Zone, U.N. Legislative Series, Laws and
Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea, U.N. Doc. ST/Leg. Ser. B/6, treaty No. 20, at
724 (1957). See also the comments of the Chile, Ecuador & Peru delegations at the Santiago
negotiations of 1955 between Chile, Ecuador, Peru and the U.S.A. concerning fishery problems,
4 M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law 1202-03 (1965):
Precisely, the extension which the three countries have given to their
sovereignty over the sea has, as its scientific basis, the defense of the great 'bioma'
implanted in this region of the Pacific; and not merely the conservation of stocks of
fish in which other countries may have a commercial interest . . .
From the above we infer that a perfect unity and inter-dependence exists
between the communities that live in the sea, which supports their life, and the
coastal population which requires both to survive. (Emphasis added.)
92. Latin American Meeting on Aspects of the Law of the Sea: Declaration and Resolutions,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/28 (1970), in 10 Int'l Legal Materials 207, at 208 (1971).
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concerning pollution: "The right of the coastal State to prevent
contamination of the waters and other dangerous and harmful effects
that may result from the use, exploration or exploitation of the area
adjacent to its coasts ... "93
Similar argument and emphasis were shown more recently by the
Caribbean countries at their meeting in Santo Domingo de Guzman
94
in June, 1972.
Obviously a very strong reason for the extension of jurisdiction in
these cases is the desire of the Latin American coastal states to
allocate to themselves as large a share as possible of the dwindling sea
resources. This in itself, however, is evidence of a concern over
present methods of using the environment. The extension of jurisdiction or of exclusive fishery zones by coastal states is spreading. The
latest to join the group is Iceland which recently extended its fishery
zone from 12 to 50 miles. 95
C. Pollution of the Air
Air is another element which, like water, knows no boundaries and
can carry pollutants far and wide. An oft-cited and well-documented
example of such pollution is the acid rain of southern Scandinavia
which, a Swedish study has demonstrated, results from the emission of
sulfur from industrial sources hundreds of miles away in Western
Europe. 96 Even more dramatically, the distance traveled by nuclear
93. Id.
94. Specialized Conference of Caribbean Countries Concerning the Problems of the Sea:
Declaration of Santo Domingo, done at Santo Domingo de Guzman, June 9, 1972. Text in 11
Int'l Legal Materials 892 (July 1972).
95. Iceland, Resolution on Fisheries Jurisdiction, Feb. 15, 1972. Text in 11 Int'l Legal
Materials 643 (May 1972). See also table of territorial sea and fishing-zone limits claimed, in The
Statesman's Year-Book 1972-1973 at xxiv-xxv (1972).
The special interests and rights of the coastal state in the protection (though not exclusive
exploitation) of marine living resources off its coasts beyond territorial waters were already
recognized by the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas [19661 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969. The United States Draft
Articles on Territorial Sea, Straits and Fisheries, submitted to the U.N. Sea-Beds Committee,
may be prepared to recognize an exclusive right, though not at the distance claimed by the
Latin American states:
In most cases where broader jurisdictional claims have been made, the reasons for
those claims were resource-oriented. We believe that the real concerns of those
few states that have claimed broader limits for the territorial sea can be
accommodated in the course of the work of this and the other subcommittees.
U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. II/L.4 (1971), in 65 Dep't State Bull. 261-262 (1971). In view of
this it would seem that there exists at least a right of the coastal state to protect living resources
off its shores. It is not clear how far from shore such right extends, but the trend seems to be to
grant the coastal state exclusive rights to exploit these living resources in rather large areas.
96. Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Air Pollution Across National Boundaries: The Impact
on the Environment of Sulfur in Air and Precipitation (Sweden's Case Study for the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment) 87 (1971).
The probable average time of a few days during which sulfur pollutants remain
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fall-out from tests shows the extent to which pollutants can be carried
around the world in the upper atmosphere. Realization of the damage
which nuclear pollution can cause led to the nuclear test-ban treaty of
1963. 97 However, the ban is not complete since two nuclear powers
(China and France) have refused, so far, to be bound by the treaty.
More recently, the U.N. General Assembly adopted, and requested
that it be opened for signature by all states, a convention prohibiting
the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological
(biological) and toxin weapons. 9 8 This is the latest link in a long line of
attempts 99 to limit or prohibit the use of weapons that, by contamination of the air, destroy or impair the life-supporting environment of
large areas. 100
The number and widespread acceptance of these agreements points
to the emergence of a rule of customary international law. Air
pollution itself, however, did not explicitly receive international
attention until the late thirties, in the Trail Smelter case. 10 1 Although
Canada admitted responsibility for damage inflicted by the smelter
(and this in itself is of considerable significance), the Arbitration
Tribunal, drawing on the limited jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court in air pollution and on analogies from international
water cases (since it could not find international air pollution
precedents), declared generally: "no state has the right to use or
permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by
fumes in or to the territory of another ... "102 The Tribunal thus
boldly transferred to international air pollution a general but vague
airborne means that the deposition in any one place will be dependent on the
emissions within a surrounding area with a radius of one to two thousand
kilometres. The problem is thus an internationalone.
97. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
98. United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, in 11
Int'l Legal Materials 310 (1972).
99. Declaration Concerning the Prohibition of the Use of Projectiles Which Have as Their
Sole Purpose the Spreading of Asphyxiating or Noxious Gases, done at the Hague, July 29, 1899,
26 Martens Nouveau Recueil Gn6ral, ser. 2 998. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land, annexed to the Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 2 Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and
Agreements, 2281, 2285. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and
Germany, signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919, art. 171, [1919] Foreign Rel. U.S. 13 Paris Peace
Conf. 329 (1947). Protocol Prohibiting the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for signature June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, 3
Int'l Legislation 1670 (M. Hudson ed. 1932).
100. See generally, Baxter & Buergenthal, Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, 64
Am. J. Int'l L. 853 (1970).
101. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941), 35 Am. J. Int'l L. 684 (1941).
102. Trail Smelter Arbitration, supra note 101, at 1965; Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal,
supra note 101, at 716.
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principle-that a state could not allow private persons to use its
territory for activities injurious to another state-which until then had
been applied mostly to the attacks of revolutionary bands across
frontiers. 10 3 This generalization so far has had little application in
state relations concerning air pollution; and only now can it be
expected to find support and concrete expression in conventions-probably at first in Europe, where both the concern and the
104
search for remedies have reached a comparatively advanced stage.
However, this principle did underlie the preoccupation with the
protection of climate shown by the Stockholm Conference in several
recommendations charging states to consult with each other before
undertaking activities that might affect climate. 10 5 Here, even more
than in other and older areas of international environmental law, the
Stockholm exhortation that rules of states' liability for damage be
106
further elaborated is applicable.
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN

The expansion of conventional and customary international rules on
the protection of the environment points to a shift from the internal to
the external plane amounting to the internationalization of environmental concern. This has a parallel in human rights where international law was first applied to the rights of aliens 07 and only later,
and quite recently, to the treatment of nationals by their own
governments. The transition in human rights from concern with
situations involving the interest of other individual states (protection
of aliens) to concern with situations involving the interest of the
103. See United Nations Secretariat, Survey of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/1/
Rev. 1, at 34 (1949). The relevant passages are conveniently quoted in W. Bishop, International
Law, Cases and Materials 398-99 (3rd. ed. 1971). See also D. Bowett, Self-Defense in
International Law 30-31 (1958).
104. See Bleicher, supra note 68, at 43-45.
105. Stockholm Report, supra note 26, at 40. Recommendation 70 urges governments to:
be mindful of activities in which there is an appreciable risk of effects on climate,
and to this end:
(a) Carefully evaluate the likelihood and magnitude of climatic effects and
disseminate their findings to the maximum extent feasible before embarking on
such activities;
(b) Consult fully other interested States when activities carrying a risk of such
effects are being contemplated or implemented. Id. at 42.
Recommendation 79 proposes the establishment of a network of stations to monitor "long-term
global trends in atmospheric constituents and properties" which might cause climatic changes.
Id. at 4. Principle 6 of the Declaration proclaims:
The discharge of toxic substances and the release of heat in such quantities or
concentrations as to exceed the capacity of the environment to render them
harmless must be halted in order to ensure that serious or irreversible damage is
not inflicted upon ecosystems . . .
106. Principle 22 of the Declaration. Id. at 7; see also supra note 65.
107. See e.g., H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights 121 (1950).
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international community (treatment of nationals) was marked by the
adoption of the U.N. Charter in 1945 which specifically referred to
Human Rights. 10 8 Though the binding effect of these articles was
challenged, the U.N. General Assembly gradually asserted its authority to discuss and investigate human rights violations in the internal
affairs of particular states. 10 9 The growing number of conventions-the latest of which is the American Convention of
196911 0-further attests to the rapid internationalization of this
subject.
International protection of the environment also evolved from areas
where the interests of states were directly and immediately affected
(transboundary waters), to other areas and situations in which states'
interests are less visibly involved (protection of the marine environment). Although, in the principles and recommendations of the
Stockholm Conference, there is no explicit attempt at the regulation
of internal environmental standards in situations not directly affecting
other states, concern with such standards can be deduced as an
ultimate conclusion from some of them. For instance, Paragraph 128
of the preparatory document A/CONF. 48/8 refers to pollution
problems which "may be of international significance because of their
common occurrence in many states.""' This is but a short step away
from an implied exhortation to adopt international standards for
problems limited to the confines of a single state. With some
stretching of the point, it may even be claimed that the whole chapter
of the Stockholm Report concerning pollutants of international
significance already contains such an implied exhortation. 112 Similarly, there are hints in the Stockholm Declaration that population
growth is no longer the domain of national policy alone, but has
become a problem of international dimensions. Principle 16 of that
Declaration states:
Demographic policies, which are without prejudice to basic
human rights and which are deemed appropriate by Governments
concerned, should be applied in those regions where the rate of
population growth or excessive population concentrations are
108. U.N. Charter arts. 1, 13, 55, 56, 62, 68 and 76.
109. See Everyman's United Nations 349-69 (1968); See also 1972 Int'l L. Ass'n, Conference,
Int'l Comm. on Human Rights, Rep.; Lauterpacht, supra note 107, at 166-220; G. Ezejiofor,
Protection of Human Rights Under the Law 72-90 (1964).
110. American Convention on Human Rights, done Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Official Records,
O.E.A. Ser. K/XVI/I.I, Doe. No. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 2 (1970); in 65 Am. J. Int'l L. 679 (1971).
111. United Nations General Assembly, Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm,
5-16 June 1972, Identification and Control of Pollutants of Broad International Significance
(Subject Area III), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/8 at 47 (1972).
112. Stockholm Report, supra note 26, at 40-44.
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likely to have adverse effects on the environment or develop113
ment ....

This may be the first step on the long road to the establishment of a
norm-setting process in this area.
The relative primitiveness of environmental protection, as compared with protection of human rights, is also evident in the stage of
evolution of machinery to implement it. The Environment Council
and Secretariat, envisaged at the Stockholm Conference and established by the General Assembly, are confined to information gathering,
coordination of U.N. programs, and the issuance of non-binding
guidelines." 4 They have not the power, for example, of the U.N.
Political Rights Covenant's Committee to receive and pass on
complaints by states or individuals. 115 This is understandable because
the Stockholm Declaration and Recommendations are not international agreements and do not impose binding obligations on states.
However, environmental organs of the U.N. could have been given
powers similar to those of the United Nations Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights Committee to study and comment on reports
submitted by states 1 6 since the right to a good environment is similar
to and partakes of all the difficulties and drawbacks of social and
economic rights. One interesting aspect of the similarity of the right is
that, just as the developing nations have a privileged position under
the U.N. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant in that they
may, when necessary, discriminate against aliens in the application of
these rights, 117 so may they claim a wider latitude in the application
118
of environmental protection measures.
113. Id. at 6.
114. Stockholm Report, supra note 26, at 62-63; Report of the U.N. Second Committee,
supra note 26, at 36-39.
115. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 40-43, and its Optional
Protocol in 61 Am. J. Int'l L. 870, at 88 2-85, 887-90 (1967).
116. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, arts. 16-22, in 61 Am.
J. Int'l L. 861, at 867-68 (1967).
117. Id. at 862. Art. 3 states:
Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their national
economy, may determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic
rights recognized in the present Covenant to non-nationals.
118. See e.g., Stockholm Report, supra note 26, at 7. Principle 23 of the Declaration would
authorize a dual system of standards, since those standards "which are valid for the most
advanced countries . . . may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost" for the
developing countries. See also Stockholm Report, supra note 26 at 61-65. The Resolution on
Institutional and Financial Arrangements sets up the Governing Council, Environmental
Secretariat and Environmental Fund, which recommends that the Council:
maintain under continuing review the impact of national and international
environmental policies and measures on developing countries, as well as the
problem of additional costs that might be incurred by developing countries in the
implementation of environmental programmes and projects, to ensure that such
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LONG-RANGE IMPLICATIONS: THE CLOSED-WORLD CONCEPT

A. Potentialand Actual Impact on National Sovereignty
The immediate and direct effect of environmental concern on
international law has been to promote the creation of rules for
protection of particular elements of the environment with the main
emphasis on pollution control. In addition, this concern is visibly
contributing to the elaboration of the rules of state responsibility for
injury to the environment outside national jurisdiction. The general
aim of most of these existing and emerging rules is to patch up the
environment so that economic expansion can go on as before. This is
based on a belief that present problems are primarily due to neglect
and lack of organization; that technology can clean up the environment and keep it clean; and that the same technology can continue to
increase food supply and eke out even non-renewable resources at a
reasonable rate in the foreseeable future. 119 This is the optimistic
view. The pessimistic view is that the life-supporting capacity of the
earth-that is, the absorptive capacity of the environment and the
supply of food and natural resources-is inexorably finite; that
exponential increases in population and industrial production are the
real causes of environmental deterioration and destruction. The
theme is evident in Only One Earth;2 0 in some parts of the
programmes and projects shall be compatible with the development plans and
priorities of those countries ....
(para. 2f)
and:
in order that the development priorities of developing countries shall not be
adversely affected, adequate measures should be taken to provide additional
financial resources on terms compatible with the economic situation of the
recipient developing country. . . . (para. 10).
In its Draft Resolution IX, the General Assembly's Second Committee, commenting on the
Stockholm Recommendations, went further still and requested assurance of the compatability of
environmental programs with "the objectives and policy measures of global strategies and
sectoral guidelines for the economic development of developing countries," as well as a
comprehensive report from the Secretary-General on all U.N. programs and special-purpose
funding so as to permit "an evaluation of their conformity with the over-all policies and
priorities of development." Report of the Second Committee, supra note 26, at 47, 2 and 5.
119. Belief in the omnipotence of technology is the underlying assumption, for example, of
the so-called Green Revolution, a radical breakthrough in agricultural production, which relies
on massive applications of fertilizer to boost yields of new hybrid grains to unprecedented
levels, but which brings into play a new spectrum of environmental problems. See B. Ward & R.
Dubos, Only One Earth: the Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet 156-66 (1972). Another
example is the speech of Robert S. McNamara, president of the World Bank, to the Stockholm
Conference on June 8, 1972, in which he claimed that there was no evidence that economic
growth would necessarily involve an unacceptable burden on the environment and referred to
"alarmist views about continued growth." It is evident also in the provisions of the Stockholm
Conference concerning the Environment Fund, which refer to "promotion of environmental
research and studies for the development of industrial and other technologies best suited to a
policy of economic growth compatible with adequate environmental safeguards.
(Emphasis added) Stockholm Report, supra note 26, at 64.
120. Ward & Dubos, supra note 119, at 111.
What is certain is that our sudden, vast accelerations-in numbers, in the use of
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Stockholm Conference Declaration and recommendations; 12 1 in the
M.I.T. study for the Club of Rome, The Limits of Growth, which gives
it a scientific underpinning by attempting to show mathematically
that such growth must inevitably lead to eventual collapse. 122 In
consequence, the only way seen to stave off further deterioration of
the environment and the collapse of civilization is to stabilize world
population and production and to keep them in a state of constant
123
equilibrium.
The findings of studies such as The Limits to Growth are hotly
contested, 124 but a belief in the finiteness of the earth's life-supporting
capacity is widely held. Regardless of the basic soundness of the
theory, if it were to become dominant, it would tend to transform
present economic and political institutions, since a world community
which strove to attain the desired equilibrium would become an
energy and new materials, in urbanization, in consumptive ideals, in consequent
pollution-have set technological man on a course which could alter dangerously
and perhaps irreversibly, the natural systems of this planet upon which his
biological survival depends. Today when only a third of humanity has entered the
technological age, the pressures are already apparent.
121. See e.g., Stockholm Report, supra note 26, at 6. Principle 16 states:
Demographic policies, which are without prejudice to basic human rights and
which are deemed appropriate by Governments concerned, should be applied in
those regions where the rate of population growth or excessive population
concentrations are likely to have adverse effects on the environment ...
See also Stockholm Report, supra note 26, at 13. Recommendation 12(2) states:
the World Health Organization should promote and intensify research endeavor
in the field of human reproduction, so that the serious consequences of population
explosion on human environment can be prevented ...
Principle 6, on the absorptive capacity of the environment (quoted supra note 105), Principle 5,
warning that the non-renewable resources of the earth must be employed in such a way as to
guard against the danger of their future exhaustion (Stockholm Report, supra note 26, at 4), and
Recommendation 106(a):
the Secretary-General, in cooperation with other international bodies as appropriate, should examine the extent to which the problem of pollution could be
ameliorated by a reduction in the current levels of production and in the future
rate of growth of the production of synthetic products. . . . (Id. at 57).
122. D. Meadows, The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the
Predicament of Mankind 124, 127 (1972). Figure 35 is a world model "standard" run assuming,
as of 1970, a 250-year supply of all resources at 1970 usage rates and no major change in
physical, economic or social relationships. Figure 36 is a world model based on the assumption
that new discoveries or advances in technology could double the amount of resources
economically available. Both figures show collapse within the next century, the first caused by a
resource crisis, the second by pollution exceeding the absorptive capacity of the environment.
123. Id. at ch, 5. See also Schachter, New Directions in InternationalLaw, 49 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 13, 14-17 (1972).
124. See Forum, June 8, 1972, at 2. The report was bitterly attacked in a debate on June 7,
1972 at the Environment Forum, which ran simultaneously with the U.N. Conference on the
Human Environment at Stockholm. It also received some unflattering comments from
economists, such as Simon S. Kuznets ("It's a simplistic kind of conclusion") and Henry C.
Wallich, who termed a no-growth economy an "upper-income baby," referring to those who
have "enough money and now . . . want a world fit for them to travel in and look at the poor,"
quoted in article by Robert Reinhold, in N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
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economically (and probably politically) closed society. Can any sign
of such a transformation be seen? Before attempting to answer this
question, some broad assumptions must be made about the rules
governing such a future world community in the economic and
political spheres.
First, it seems reasonable to postulate that the widespread restrictions necessary to keep population and production stable would
require a strong central authority. It is interesting to note that most of
the regional communities of the world that ceased to expand in the
past became, as Toynbee attempted to show, regional universal states
subject to a central authority.' 2 5 One regional society which escaped
this fate was western Europe. It may be argued that it did so because
it became an expanding community. However, this escape may be
only temporary. If the environmentalist predictions come true,
western Europe will be absorbed into a non-expanding world
community. Theoretical considerations apart, the integrative influence of environmental concern on international politics has so far
been slight. Resistance to it can be seen in the reluctance of delegates
at the Stockholm Conference to create a really strong, independent
environmental organization. The Environmental Secretariat may
strengthen the United Nations organization through the embodiment
of a new, vital purpose; but this will be on an economic level in which
even the United Nations' predecessor, the League of Nations, showed
some success, rather than on a political one in which both organizations represent a pluralistic world. However, it seems most likely
that the central authority postulated for a world community in
equilibrium with the environment would be imposed rather than
agreed upon. Fear of exhaustion of natural resources may lead the
stronger nations to try to secure for themselves as large a share as they
can-a development already heralded by the expanding jurisdictional
claims over marine resources; instead of a diminution of national
sovereignty, the conviction that an economically closed society is
inevitable might have entirely the opposite effect, ushering in a
period of upheaval, which in Toynbee's scheme, is the invariable
26
prelude to the emergence of a universal state.'
The second assumption is that the law of a closed world community
would be concerned rather with distribution than with production.
Distribution might be on a basis of equality or inequality, in which
latter case it would tend to freeze the economic status quo between
states and between groups within states. We already have, in
125. See generally, A. Toynbee, A Study of History (abridgment by D. Somervell 1947),
especially at 2-3 of vol. 1.
126. Id.
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international law, examples of concern with distribution in situations
where a finite resource must be divided between a number of states.
One such example is the principle of equitable apportionment,
an
127
essentially distributive device, in international river basins.
The growing interest in division and distribution of resources is
most plainly visible in the proliferation of coastal states' claims to a
larger share of marine resources caused, in great part, by the
realization that these resources are not infinite but rapidly diminishing. l2 8 Emphasis on distribution is also evident in the demands of
the developing countries for assistance as of right, expressed in the
Preamble to the Stockholm Declaration: ". . . the industrialized
countries should make efforts to reduce the gap between themselves
and the developing countries." 12 9 Repeatedly, the Conference recommends that the costs and the economic consequences of environmental measures should be equitably distributed, that is, they should be
borne mainly by the developed countries. Principle 12 of the
Declaration, for example, proclaims:
Resources should be made available to preserve and improve the
environment, taking into account the circumstances and particular requirements of developing countries and any costs which may
emanate from their incorporating environmental safeguards into
their development planning and the need for making available to
them, upon their request, additional international technical and
financial assistance for this purpose ....130
and the Action Plan recommends:
where environmental concerns lead to restrictions on trade, or to
stricter environmental standards with negative effects on exports,
particularly from developing countries, appropriate measures for
compensation should be worked out within the framework of
existing contractual and institutional arrangements and any new
such arrangements that can be worked out in the future...131
and:
the preoccupation of developed countries with their own environmental problems should not affect the flow of assistance to
developing countries, and that this flow should be adequate to
meet the additional environmental requirements of such countries.'32
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Helsinki Rules, supra note 18.
See supra note 95.
Stockholm Report, supra note 26, at 2.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 55 (Recommendation 103).
Id. at 57-58 (Recommendation 109).
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Thirdly, in such a closed community, the ultimate disposal of
natural resources would reside in the postulated central authority,
rather than in local units. This central authority would control these
resources either for the benefit of all (under the most favorable and
optimistic conditions) or in some other way imposed by the needs of
society. This assumption of diluted national sovereignty over natural
resources is a corollary of, and proceeds from, the two first assumptions of central authority and emphasis on distribution.
In today's world, national sovereignty over natural resources seems,
at first sight, to be as strongly entrenched as ever. It was vehemently
defended at the Stockholm Conference by countries such as Brazil,
and is enshrined in the Principle 21 of the Declaration: "States
have . . .the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant
to their own environmental policies .... "133 But this Principle is
coupled with emphasis on a state's responsibility for damage to
resources and to the environment outside its territory. With some
stretching of the imagination, this may be seen as a sign that national
sovereignty over resources is beginning to shrink. More could perhaps
be read into the recognition that at least some resources belong to the
international community, to be kept in trust for all mankind, rather
than to individual nations. The concept of world heritage has begun
to find legal expression in instruments such as the draft conventions
concerning wetlands, islands, and historical sites 134 and the proposal
for a draft convention on endangered species of wildlife. 135 It may be
that this awareness of world heritage in respect of certain resources is
a precursor of the emergence of a new concept of international trust
over all resources which would replace national ownership or
sovereignty.
Do these assumptions find any support in the record of past
societies which can be considered closed? A future closed world
133. Id. at 7; see also supra note 66.
134. International Conference on the Conservation of Wetlands and Waterfowl, Final Act
and Summary Record, Ramsar, Iran, Jan. 30, Feb. 3, 1971. Text of Convention at 17. United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Intergovernmental Working Group on
Conservation, Draft Convention on Conservation of Certain Islands for Science U.N. Doc.
* A/CONF.48/IWGC.I/12 (Oct. 11, 1971), and Draft Convention on Conservation of the World
Heritage, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/IWGC.I/13 (Oct. 11, 1971),
135. Recommendation 99 of the Action Plan:
that a plenipotentiary conference be- convened as soon as possible, under
appropriate governmental or intergovernmental auspices, to prepare and adopt a
convention on export, import and transit of certain species of wild animals and
plants.
Stockholm Report, Supra note 26, at 52. See United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, Intergovernmental Working Group on Conservation, Draft Convention on
Export, Import and Transit of Certain Species of Wild Animals and Plants, prepared by IUCN,
June 1971, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/IWGC.I/6 (July 1971).
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community would not be expected to become a replica of those past
communities, since it would differ from them radically in economic
and technical level and in being, for the first time, planetary in scope;
nevertheless, their institutions may indicate trends and direction of
development. Thus, for example, medieval Europe, that slowly
expanding and at times stagnating society, had a supreme authority in
the institution of the Papacy and Empire. 136 Its political system, in
contrast to the classical international law, was based on inequality
and subordination of political units. Hierarchy was inherent in the
feudal system. Power over territory was given by the supreme ruler;
and, therefore, the idea of territorial sovereignty, including
sovereignty over resources, was little developed.' 3 7 (It is noteworthy
that the first theoretical discussion of sovereignty was written in the
16th century when the expansion of the European community had
already begun. 138 ) Medieval Europe was a class society with the share
of each class in the community wealth pre-ordained and defined.
Trade and industry were minutely regulated by traditionally established rules. Such occupation was considered inferior and constraints on
moneylending and credit so restricted development that wealth was
increased rather by war and private violence than by the expansion of
production.

139

B. The Encouragementof Utopian Trends
The idea of an irrevocably closed, finite world hurtling through
space in frightening loneliness not only favors the emergence of rules
for dividing and distributing resources in accordance with the known
136. Other similar (that is, slowly expanding) regional societies also developed central
authorities, as a rule in the final stage. See supra note 125.
137. See generally on this subject, R. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (Mentor
ed., 1952), Chapt. I, The Medieval Background; H. Pirenne, Economic and Social History of
Medieval Europe (1937); G. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (1937); and F. Ganshof, The
Middle Ages: A History of International Relations (1970).
138. J. Bodin, La R6publique (1583).
139. Tawney (supra note 137, at 28) states:
In spite of the ingenuity of theorists, finance and trade . . . were not easily
interpreted in terms of social function. Comparatively late intruders in a world
dominated by conceptions hammered out in a pre-commercial age, they were
never fitted harmoniously into the medieval synthesis. ...
and:
At every turn, therefore, there are limits, restrictions, warnings against allowing
economic interests to interfere with serious affairs. It is right for a man to seek
such wealth as is necessary for a livelihood in his station. To seek more is not
enterprise, but avarice, and avarice is a deadly sin. Trade is legitimate . . . but it
is a dangerous business. A man must be sure that he carries it on for the public
benefit, and that the profits which he takes are no more than the wages of his
labor. Private property is a necessary institution . . . but it is to be tolerated as a
concession to human frailty, not applauded as desirable in itself. ...
Id. at 35.
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limitations of supply, but also reveals glimpses of a more distant
society in which other forms of life may be admitted to fuller
partnership with man. Belief in a sort of companionship-brotherhood
even-of all living things can be found in varying degree in the
writing of theoreticians on environment. 140 What the result of this full
partnership would be must be left to speculation and may never be
realized. However, it can be assumed that if man were displaced from
his unique position as the focal point of all nature, the law in such a
society would inevitably be less anthropocentric. It would have to
consider not only the welfare and interests of man but also of other
animate beings and even inanimate objects. It has already been quite
seriously argued that perhaps the only way to preserve the environment from ultimate destruction is to accord living, and in some cases
non-living, elements of the environment legal rights, enforced through
the institutuion of guardianship (somewhat similar to guardianship of
1
incompetents and minors). 14
Enlarging the scope of law beyond intra-human relationships is not
new. Many primitive societies, past and present, have (or had) a
140. See, e.g., the concluding lines of J. Krutch, Preface to J. Fisher, et al., Wildlife in Danger
at 8 (1969):
Others (and I would include myself among them) are inclined to insist that there
is such a thing as human nature and that it needs contact with the natural world
of which it is a part. Perhaps the late William Morton Wheeler, an impeccable
technical scientist, put the whole thing most succinctly when he wrote about our
fellow creatures: "That, apart from the members of our own species, they are our
only companions in an infinite and unsympathetic waste of electrons, planets,
nebulae and stars, is a perennial joy and consolation."
Also L. White, Jr., The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis, in The Environmental
Handbook 26 (G. De Bell ed. 1970):
The greatest spiritual revolutionary in Western history, Saint Francis, proposed
what he thought was an alternative Christian view of nature and man's relation to
it: he tried to substitute the idea of man's limitless rule of creation . . . We must
rethink and refeel our nature and destiny. The profoundly religious, but heretical,
sense of the primitive Franciscans for the spiritual autonomy of all parts of nature
may point a direction. I propose Francis as a patron saint for ecologists.
141. See Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 450 (1972). See also the dissenting opinion of Justice William 0. Douglas in Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). He would confer standing upon environmental objects to
sue for their own preservation, citing ships and corporations as inanimate objects which have
long been parties in litigation:
So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries,
beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air that feels the destructive
pressures of modern technology and modem life.
Id. at 743. The element of guardianship is evident in his statement:
Those who hike it (Mineral King), fish it, hunt it, camp in it, or frequent it, or visit
it merely to sit in solitude and wonderment are legitimate spokesmen for it,
whether they may be a few or many. Those who have that intimate relation with
the inanimate object about to be injured, polluted, or otherwise despoiled are its
legitimate spokesmen.
Id. at 74445.
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well-developed body of rules governing their relations with animate
and inanimate nature; 14 2 and the majestic system of natural law
encompassed the relations of the whole universe. 14 3 However, the
natural law system dealt in a remote and somewhat theoretical
manner with the non-human element in nature; and the rules
governing human affairs were man-centered. The law of all living
things, as presently conceived, has more affinity with primitive law
because of the closer and more equal relationship between man and
nature in the latter. However, while in primitive law harmony
between man and nature was to be achieved through rules protecting
man from nature and securing him nature's benefits, this law seems
designed to protect nature from man and, in this respect, is the least
anthropocentric system of all.
But there are few traces of the enlargement of existing law in this
direction. It would be an exaggeration to claim that conventions for
the so-called protection of certain sea mammals, 144 for example,
142. See, e.g., E. Hoebel, The Law of Primitive Man: A Study in Comparative Legal
Dynamics (1954), in which he says of the Ifugao of Northern Luzon in the Philippines at 120:
Animals are attributed with legal personalities. Maliciously to kill an animal is
akin to killing a person; an animal is a sort of household member, and to the
Ifugao mind the assault is an assault of a personal nature. The damages are called
labod, exactly as the damages assessed in the homicide cases that may be
composed-and they are heavy indeed.
On the sense of separation of modern man from non-human nature, see J. Tolkien's illuminating
passage in The Tolkien Reader (Ballantine ed., 1966) at 66:
A vivid sense of that separation is very ancient; but also sense that it was a
severance: a strange fate and a guilt lies on us. Other creatures are like other
realms with which Man has broken off relations, and sees now only from the
outside at a distance, being at war with them, or on the terms of an uneasy
armistice.
143. See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part II (First Part), in Readings in Jurisprudence 29-30
(J. Hall ed. 1938).
Thus implying that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good
and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an
imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is
nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law . . .
Even irrational animals partake in their own way of the Eternal Reason, just as
the rational creature does. But because the rational creature partakes thereof in
an intellectual and rational manner, therefore the participation of the eternal law
in the rational creature is properly called a law, since a law is something
pertaining to reason as stated above. Irrational creatures, however, do not partake
thereof in a rational manner, wherefore there is no participation of the eternal
law in them, except by way of similitude.
See also T. Rutherforth, Institutes of NaturalLaw, Id. at 68:
A LAW is a rule to which men are obliged to make their moral actions
conformable. The word law has indeed a much more extensive signification: all
rules, from which any beings whatsoever either will not, or cannot, or ought not
to deviate, are so many laws to them. The rules, which God has set to himself to
work by; the rules, which brute creatures are led by their instinct to obey; and the
rules, which inanimate matter in its motions and operations cannot but observe,
are usually called the laws of their several natures.
144. See supra at 19-21.
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imply a distinct right of wildlife, or that they are concluded primarily
for the benefit of the species protected. The language they employ-terms such as "sustained yield" and "harvest"-likens wildlife
rather to field crops and other vegetative resources and in no way
represents the anti-anthropocentric viewpoint. Perhaps domestic
legislation protecting threatened forms of life, such as the United
States statute on the importation of endangered species, 145 points
toward an enlargement of the law concerning protection of wildlife in
a rather restricted area. However, the slow progress toward a draft
convention on the subject 14 6 suggests that the idea that it is illegal to
exploit other forms of life to the point of extermination is still
struggling to become a rule of law on the international plane. Were it
not so, the International Whaling Commission's refusal in July 1972 to
heed the whaling moratorium adopted by the Stockholm
Conference 147 would be a violation of international law, despite the
fact that the Stockholm recommendations are not binding. The most
powerful argument for the illegality of "speciecide" may be that it
would eventually deprive nature of its laboratory and might thus
mortally endanger man himself. This was well understood at the
Stockholm Conference, which devoted substantial time and effort to
formulating recommendations for the establishment of genetic
pools.'

48

CONCLUSION
The impact of environmental concern on the international community and on international law has already been considerable; and
there are indications that, as time goes on, that impact will rapidly
increase. The immediate, but far-reaching, consequence of this
impact is the emergence of a nucleus of environmental international
law. Its constitutional aspects are based upon the statutes and powers
of institutions dealing with the environment. Its substantive laws are
carved from those particular rules of international water law and law
of the sea devoted to the protection of the fluvial and marine
environment, to which are being added developing rules for the
protection of the atmosphere and of resources on land. Its procedural
elements, embracing the difficult task of how to make states and
individuals comply with the laws and how to implement valid
international environmentai decisions, are being built upon existing
procedural rules of state responsibility for injury to other states and
individuals.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, 16 U.S.C. §668aa et seq. (1970).
See 3 BNA Environmental Reporter [1972 Transfer Binder] Current Dev. 302 (1972).
See supra note 82.
Stockholm Report, supra note 26, at 24-31 (Recommendations 39-45).

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 13

The long-range consequences may be even more far-reaching,
depending on whether technology will make economic expansion
compatible with preservation of the life-sustaining environment. If
not, then eventually, by agreement or otherwise, the expansion of
production will have to be reduced or stopped altogether; and,
predictably, the emphasis would shift in the internationalcommunity
in general, and in international law in particular, from development
to distribution. It is also possible to foresee, in such a society, the
emergence, after perhaps a period of unrest, of a central authority
which would assure the distribution of limited resources on an equal
or unequal basis, depending on how the period of unrest were
resolved.
Finally, far beyond the horizon, lies the dreamland of the environmentalists-the goal to which the environmentalist movement may
eventually lead-a rationally ordered community in which the rights
to existence of all, or almost all, species are recognized, limited only
by the similar rights of others. In such a community, man would cease
to be a destroyer and become a benevolent steward with the
responsibility of assuring the survival of other species within the
limitations imposed by the life-sustaining capacity of the environment
and within a legal system enlarged to encompass interests other than
those purely human.

